This paper examines the National Systems of Innovation (NSI) of Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries and attempts to assess their performances. Although it points out at a number of specific successes, overall, the region's NSI have evolved since their inception in the 1950s into weak entities. Science and technology institutions and organisations are not fully performing an enabling role; links and interactions between government support organisations, businesses and academia are tenuous; investment in intangibles and human capital is low; and, public policy is only partially effective. The main result of such weakness is that LAC countries' innovative performance has, as measured by the index of the technological specialisation (ITS) which relates the world's normalised shares of high-to low-tech exports, with the only exception perhaps of Mexico, remained stagnant or has fallen and has lost relatively to many countries that started at similar levels twenty years ago.
Introduction
Following World War II, the need to move from lower to higher value-added activities and to create employment, coupled with intellectual developments at the then United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, led most governments in the region to introduce import substitution policies aimed at accelerating industrial growth through the produc tion of manufactured goods for the local market.
Initially, import substitution policies were quite suc cessful in speeding industrialization. Between 1955 and 1975 , the industry of Latin American and Caribbean countries (LAC) grew at an annual rate of 6.9%. The share of industry in total output grew from around 17.5% in 1950 to 24.6% in 1980. Most consumer goods and basic inputs such as glass, steel, paper, cement, basic chemicals, petrochemicals and vehicles were substituted, as were some simpler capital goods. Industry was unable, however, to compete successfully in international markets and to generate the foreign exchange needed to finance the progression towards producing more technically ad vanced goods. Growing foreign debt provided initial 0 0 4 8 -7 3 3 3 / 9 8 / $ 1 9 . 0 0 © 1 9 9 8 Elsevier S c i e n c e B . V . Al l rights reserved.
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balance of payments relief, but by the early 1980s, LAC countries were no longer able to keep up with their payments. Since the early 1990s the region has been improving its exports and foreign payments position, but moving towards higher value-added products is proving as elusive as ever.
Much of the analysis of LAC's economic mal adies has focused on the macroeconomic level. Lax monetary and fiscal policies, unrealistic exchange rates, macroeconomic mismanagement and instabil ity and excessive government intervention have all been considered as key factors accounting for the dire international eompetitiveness of the region. An other strand of literature has focused on low rates of investment as the root cause of poor competitive performance (CEPAL, 1994a) . Ŵ hile macroeconomic and investment factors played a role, in this paper we argue that technologi cal variables had an equally significant role in ac counting for the recent economic performance of LAC. This view contrasts with some current Latin American thought that contends that technology change is meaningless in a context of export growth and that long-term integration into the world markets can be achieved through sound macroeconomic poli cies and exports of natural resources or low-tech products.
Indeed, the underlying issue in this paper is that there are great complementarities for development between a sound macroeconomic policy, a high rate of investment coupled with efficient use of natural resources, and sustained technological change and innovation in terms of the ability to compete in knowledge-intensive or high-technology sectors (Rrugman, 1979 (Rrugman, , 1981 (Rrugman, , 1987 Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Porter, 1990) . The capacity to develop knowledge-intensive or high-tech sectors has been a central theme of an extensive body of literature on National Systems of Innovation (NSI). The introduc tion of new advanced products and processes, both locally and internationally, is seen by this literature as the result of the functioning and Interactions of the institutions, organisations, investments and poli cies of the NSI.
The present paper is an attempt to assess LAC countries' NSI and international innovative perfor mance in advanced industries/products. The paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 discusses the concept of NSI. Section 3 analyses the functioning of LAC countries' NSI. After reviewing some technol ogy output indicators, Section 4 introduces the index of technological specialization (ITS) as an indicator of innovative performance and looks into LAC's long-run competitiveness in high-technology indus tries/products on the basis of this index. The paper ends with some conclusions in Section 5.
The National System of Innovation framework
The concept of National System of Innovation has been recently brought again into light by Freeman (1987) and has since been widely disseminated by Edquist (1997) , Lundvall (1992) , Nelson and Rosen berg (1993) , Niosi et al. (1993) and OECD (1992) . ^ Ereeman (1987) defined the NSI as " the network of T h e p r o p o r t i o n o f i n v e s t m e n t in G D P fell f r o m 2 4 . 2 % b e t w e e n 1 9 7 6 -1 9 8 2 to a r o u n d 1 7 % b e t w e e n 1 9 8 3 -1 9 8 9 a n d to 1 6 . 6 % in the e arly 1 9 9 0 s ( C E P A L , 1994a). B e t w e e n 1 9 7 3 -1 9 9 3 , the rate o f g r o w t h o f m a c h i n e tool c o n s u m p t i o n , a k e y c o m p o n e n t o f i n v e s t m e n t , w a s m u c h l o w e r in L a t i n A m e r i c a t h a n in all the d e v e l o p i n g a n d d e v e l o p e d w o r l d (Alcorta, 1995) .
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institutions of private and public sectors, whose ac tivities and interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new technologies" (p. l). Lundvall (1992) defined a NSI in terms of " elements and relation ships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge ..., either located within or rooted inside the bor ders of a nation state' ' (p. 2). Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) conceptualised the NSI in terms of the set of institutions whose interactions result in firms design ing and developing products and processes that are new to them. While definitions are quite similar at face value, there are some differences in meaning, emphasis and use of the concept. One source of difference arises out of whether the NSI should encompass a well-de fined specific science and technology set of institu tions and organisations or should it be broader so that it includes production, marketing, finance or any other relevant body. Or, put in slightly different terms, what are the internal limits to the NSI? The second difference refers to the extent to which NSI are, in fact, 'national'. At one side of the spectrum, there are those that stress that globalisation and the increasing international links between scientists and diffusion processes are rendering the NSI a very open system and at the other are those that point out that differences in size and resource availability ac companied by common history, culture, language, laws and policies still reifies a NSI. To make diver sity even wider, and matters more interesting, to gether with the issue of external geographical NSI delimitation there are the issues of whether and to what extent there are supraregional, regional or sec toral systems of innovation. The third contrast arises from the concept of innovation itself, with some authors focusing mainly on technological innova tions while others having a broader understanding of innovation so as to include organisational and institu tional innovations. A fourth variance emerges from the concept of systems with some viewing it as a simple aggregation of institutions or sectors while others pointing at the synergies that originate from their joint operation. Finally, differences emanate from the importance ascribed to each element in the system with some putting the accent on institutions, and certain kinds of them, and others on their rela tionships.
It would be pretentious to define NSI concepts and interrelations as a theory (Edquist, 1997) . In addition to differences in approaches and emphasis there would seem to be too many variables and determinants at play and their precise interactions and causalities are difficult to establish. * Relation ships are sometimes broad and diffuse and there is always the risk of being so general that everything and nothing is explained. A 'theory' of NSI would either be very ambiguous or could easily become tautological. Yet, Edquist (1997) also argued that NSI ideas can be of great help if they are seen not so much as a theoretical construct, not even of the appreciative type, but as a conceptual framework or " a kind of 'wide trawl' intended to capture the processes of innovation, their determinants and some of their consequences (e.g., productivity growth and employment) in a useful way." (pp. 28-29) . There are sufficient plausible common elements and under standing in the NSI literature to guide the interpreta tion of the key issues. And, through the refining and clarification of concepts and causalities the NSI framework could eventually graduate into theoretical status. T he NSI framework, therefore, involves institu tions and organisations (Edquist and Johnson, 1997; Galli and Teubal, 1997; Smith, 1997) . Institutions are the rules and laws, established practices and common habits and routines that govern the be haviour of organisations and the individuals that conform them. Their main functions are to reduce uncertainty, regulate interaction and provide incen tives. Arguably, the main NSI institution is the intel lectual property protection regime. Organisations are the formalised structures or bodies that operate the NSI. They are the players or actors with predeter mined roles within the innovation process, including basic and applied research; knowledge dissemina tion; invention; product and process research, design.
A s a n a n o n y m o u s referee p o i n t e d out, the m a i n implication for e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h o f s u c h variety o f a p p r o a c h e s , d e t e r m i n a n t s a n d possible causalities is that it is difficult to identify clear guidelines as to w h a t variables s h o u l d b e e m p h a s i s e d . E d q u i s t ( 1 9 9 7 ) also p o i n t e d o u t that N S I ideas are firmly r o o t e d in e v o l u t i o n a r y theories o f technical c h a n g e .
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L. A ic o r ta , W. P e r e s / R e s e a r c h P o lic y 2 6 11 9 9 8 ) 8 5 7 -8 8 1 experimentation and development; and, new product commercialisation. Among others the organisations involved are schools and universities, industrial and government research laboratories, information pro viding and regulatory agencies or 'knowledge' in frastructure agencies and private and public firms.
Within organisations, however, firms play a cen tral role in the NSl. It is they which are responsible for innovating. They must develop the competencies in product design and production, in overall manage ment and assessment of consumer needs and in linking to upstream and downstream suppliers and distributors. It is they that must search, develop R&D 'routines' and further engage in the learning processes for innovation (Dosi et al" 1994; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teubal, 1995) .
Organisations link and interact in order to benefit from each other's knowledge and competencies (Lundvall, 1992; Galli and Teubal, 1997) . Each or ganisation provides the NSI with specific kinds of knowledge, all of which are necessary for successful innovative performance. Universities provide scien tific theory and engineering principles, laboratories bring in specifications on products, components and materials, firms supply knowledge on how compo nents interact and user firms provide information on emerging technological opportunities and the perfor mance of products. These interactions do not only involve markets but personal, professional acquain tances and institutional relations are important too. Interactions also result from the constant creation during the innovation process of tacit knowledge; i.e.. the understanding of how techniques, methods, designs and processes work without knowing why (Foray, 1997; Senker and Faulkner, 1996) . Tacit knowledge typically arises out of the complexity of the analyses involved and the constant resorting to experimentation and testing which characterises in novation. It cannot be easily codified nor transmitted in written form but through demonstration and dis cussion.
The key driver of the NSI is the level and effi ciency of the intangible investments it undertakes (OECD, 1992) , Intangible investments are outlays aimed at increasing the stock of knowledge other than through the purchase of physical assets. They include investments in technology, such as R&D expenditure and patents and licenses payments, and investments in education and training, in manage ment techniques and support systems and in the formation of technological and commercial links with other organisations. Investment in intangibles is the main source of growth and knowledge accumulation of the NSI. Intangibles complement physical invest ments in the sense that they also contribute to estab lishing the conditions for creating productive re sources, but unlike physical investment, technologi cal outlays may not face decreasing returns.
Public policy, in turn, provides direction and co ordination to the NSI (Dalum et al., 1992; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Galli and Teubal, 1997; Nelson, 1993) . It is generally accepted that governments must support socially useful basic research that would have not been undertaken by the market because it may be too risky. But public policy's role in the NSI goes well beyond that. Because of the number and variety of institutions and organisations and of possi ble interactions, both market and non-market, it is necessary to introduce mechanisms that will coordi nate them. Moreover, apart from their role in estab lishing and enforcing institutions, governments can impinge the NSI with a specific direction by setting priorities and providing incentives. The two main mechanisms for public policy are the funding of university or government research and programs di rectly supporting different aspects of the innovation process.
The outcome of the NSI is cumulative in that it results from the often slow and combined aggrega tion of the impact of institutions, organisations, in tangible investments and public policy and their interactions (Lundvall, 1992) . The output of the NSI can be measured in terms of indicators such as numbers of new products, share of sales derived from new products, patents, or a combination of them. Innovative performance, however, should not only be assessed through the use of quantitative changes in new products or patents as they do not fully reflect the extent of innovative activity, but also through the analysis of the distribution of technologi cal activities or 'specialisation' across different sec tors (Archibugi and Pianta, 1992 (Nadal, 1993) . Its main objectives were to promote science and technology and to link scien tific and technological research with productive ac tivities. The Brazilian National Research Council (CNPq) was established in 1951 both to promote research in all areas of human knowledge and to prepare Brazil to use its mineral resources for the production of atomic energy (Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993 ). Argentina's National Council for Science and Technology was created in 1958 with the purpose of " promoting, coordinating and carrying out research both in applied and pure sciences'' (p. 467 of Katz and Bercovich, 1993) . Underlying the creation of these organisations were UNESCO's suggestions to create bodies formulating and implementing a com prehensive science and technology policy (Nadal, 1993) .
During the 1960s and 1970s, LAC countries' NSI further developed their organizational structures. In most countries, the head of the system was the Ministry of Planning or the President's Office, sup ported by a Science and Technology Secretariat or a National Research Council. In Brazil, a Ministry for Science and Technology was eventually created. At ministry level, many countries established sectoral S&T units which, in turn, created or took control of specialized research institutes. In 1972, the Secre tariat for Industrial Technology was established at Brazil's Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Its main activities included carrying out R&D pro grams, funding technological development, supply ing technological information, administering a sys tem of property rights, regulating technology transfer through the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI), and acting as an executive secretariat to the industrial metrology, normalization and quality con trol center (Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993) . Four years later, Cuba established a number of similar institutions aimed at regulating, dis.seminating and promoting invention, scientific and technical infor mation, use of trade marks, automation, computing, medical technology and the sensible use of natural resources and the environment (Latin American Newsletters, 1983) . These institutes were put under the command of the Cuban Academy of Sciences, which headed the system. During the mid-1970s, public universities, research institutes and specialized training centers were established throughout Latin America and brought under the general guidance of their sectoral S&T department and national S&T authority (Sagasti and Cook, 1987) .
New intellectual property protection laws were also introduced during this period. In 1971, Brazil introduced an Industrial Property Code which speci fies the patent, trademark, and trade secret regimes and in 1973 a Copyrights Law (Frischtak, 1990a,b) . Brazilian patent regulations followed international conventions, although patents were not allowed or restricted in pharmaceuticals, chemicals and food stuff on grounds of the social impact of these prod ucts and there was compulsory licensing and patent lapsing rules for patents that had not been used a period after being granted. Copyrights of written works, architectural or engineering designs, music, video and software were protected for between 25 and 60 years much in the way they are done interna tionally, but trade secrets protection only contem plated disclosure to competitors through 'unfair means', e.g., industrial espionage. Enforcement of intellectual property protection laws through courts was difficult because of long delays in bringing cases to trial, trivial monetary and criminal penalties and a generalised view by judges and the public at large that there is little to gain from stringent protec tion. In Mexico, a similar legal and enforcement framework was established in 1976 (Sherwood, 1990) . Patents were restricted in a number of sectors, terms were shorter than those available internation ally and faced compulsory licensing or lapsed if not used locally early on and penalties for infringement of property protection laws were small. Together with the new organisational and institu tional structure also emerged a different approach to policy. Concerns for science and technology were often explicitly incorporated into development plans. Specific science and technology plans, aimed at co ordinating, institutionalizing and establishing long and short-term priorities for R&D, were also drawn in most countries (Oro and Sebastián, 1993; Wionczek and Márquez, 1993) . Regulations, programs and policies established to implement plans were introduced and were similar throughout the region. In the early 1970s in Brazil, all foreign investors and technology transfer contracts had to be registered and restrictive clauses involving limits on exports, pricing guidelines, use of inputs, purchase of other technology or obligation to transfer to the seller improvements made by the buyer, were forbidden (Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993) . Around the same years, Mexico established a Registry of Transfer of Technology, aimed at forbidding restrictive clauses and limiting the duration of technology transfer agreements (Nadal, 1993) . Countries like Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and, initially, Chile, under the Andean Pact regional agreement, also set limits to profit repatriation by foreign in vestors and forced foreign investors to divest in favor of local ones after some years. Also during the early 1970s, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela started technological and human resource development programs in areas such as nuclear en ergy, telecommunications, petrochemicals, informat ics, microelectronics, and biotechnology (Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993; Hobday, 1990; Nadal, 1993; Vaitsos, 1990a,b; Wionczek and Márquez, 1993) .
The financing of programs was also begun around the same time and through comparable organisations. Brazil established FUNTEC, FINAME and FINEP to finance technological change. FUNTEC was a spe cial fund created within the National Bank of Eco nomic Development to finance training of special ized technical personnel. FINAME was aimed at funding the development of the local capital goods industry. FINEP financed feasibility studies and pro ject development for investments in sectors and ac tivities considered to be of priority (Bastos, 1993; Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993) . In Mexico, CONA-CYT and the industrial technology development pro gram FONEI started a risk-sharing program whereby they would contribute up to 50%, and could lend the remainder, of the cost of using R&D facilities at universities and government institutions. FONEI, in turn, also had a program, with World Bank re sources, of funding or subsidizing R&D, technology assimilation and any technological development pro gram in priority areas or which had special novelty characteristics (Vaitsos, 1990b) .
In the 1990s, most of LAC countries' NSI changed in similar directions. Following the debt crisis of the early and mid-1980s, there has been a considerable reduction of state involvement in technological de velopment. Sectoral priorities are no longer estab lished by the state, they are instead left to the market, comparative advantage and profitability. S & T institutions have also been streamlined or elimi nated, and previous attempts to develop indigenous technologies through public enterprises in telecom munications or informatics have ceased and firms privatized. Intellectual property protection laws have been strengthened by expanding the scope of patents to previously excluded products and increasing their duration and by introducing tougher penalties (Braga, 1993) . Controls and regulations on technology trans fer have been eliminated, including provisions that discriminate in favor of local firms, set domestic content requirements or limit the acquisition of for eign capital goods (Nadal, 1993; Vaitsos, 1990b) .
There has also been a switch towards focusing what little effort was being made by the state to wards the achievement of efficiency and competi tiveness both by R&D institutions as well as by firms that could benefit from government programs. The Brazilian Program of Quality and Productivity (PBQP) was started in 1990 aimed at supporting industrial modernization on the basis of horizontal and sectoral subprograms. Measures include the de velopment and diffusion of new managerial methods and new ways of organizing human resources, in creasing the awareness and mobilizing firms to better quality and productivity, and the improvement of the articulation between government, university and in dustry. Quality and productivity programs for parts of the state's national and regional administration were also included (Bastos, 1993) . In Mexico, the Center for Technological Innovation (CIT) was cre ated within the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) with the aim of transferring indus trial technology developed at the UNAM, research ing on technology project management and ways to promote innovation, establishing training programs on innovation and innovation management, and pro viding technology-based consultancy services (Dini and Peres, 1994) . In Venezuela, the Engineering Institute, aimed at providing engineering services to industry, was also created recently.
The technological infrastructure
LAC seems to be facing acute general and techno logical infrastructure deficiencies. There are severe limitations with the regions' general physical infras tructure. Although there are variations per country, LAC's roads, energy and water supply, ports and telecommunications infrastructure, apart from having to cope with very high rates of population growth and unsatisfied demand, have deteriorated consider ably due to lack of investment in the late 1980s. Privatization of public services does not seem to be solving the problems of underinvestment, at least in the short run. Indeed, the main immediate effect of privatization has been large increases in the prices of main utilities.
The innovation support organisations are also flawed. A recent evaluation of industrial technology research institutes in LAC summarized in Machado (1993) found that although there were some excep tions industrial research organisations were facing a number of problems, many of which had intensified as a result of recent efforts of macroeconomic stabi lization and liberalization.
One of the key problems was that research and services provided were not matched to demand. Finding the right services-mix is exceedingly diffi cult because organisations must keep a balance be tween satisfying the precise demands of their clients and keeping an eye on the technologies of the future and research being done elsewhere (Goldman, 1994 Another major limitation is the lack of organisa tional flexibility (Machado, 1993) . Industrial support organisations in Latin America are normally orga nized on rigid functional lines which emphasize ver tical progression within the administrative hierarchy, allocate clear lines of responsibility, are based on secrecy and lack of information sharing and make position within the hierarchy and not knowledge the source of authority. The result is that organisations lose their problem solving capabilities, their capacity to establish and operate with purpose-built teams, their ability to communicate and react quickly to private sector and external environment demands, and to use available resources efficiently.
Human resource availability needs to be im proved. With the exception of INTEC and the Fundacin Chile in Chile, most of the industrial support organisations in Latin America have a low ratio of professional permanent to temporary staff and very high turnover of professional staff which does not allow for research and organisational continuity. In addition there is a high ratio of support to profes sional staff adding to the bureaucratic nature of many institutes. There is a total absence of wage, recruitment, promotion and training policies leading to professional frustration and low moral.
In recent years industrial support organisations are also facing severe financial restrictions as a result of fiscal retrenchment. In those organisations that have successfully moved towards self-financing, this has been done at the expense of eliminating what little independent long-term research and development projects they had. Less successful ones are struggling to make ends meet and are being forced to reduce personnel, normally the most capable, and to sell equipment. Some organisations are increasingly de pendent on foreign financial assistance.
Interactions between organisations
The evidence regarding the way parts of the innovation system interact with each other in LAC is limited and fragmented. Regarding the interaction between local users and producers of technology, research in Brazil shows a very successful experi ence in developing the close cooperative long-term relationship between financial institutions and manu facturers of banking automation equipment (Cassiolato, 1992; CEPAL, 1990; Frischtak, 1991) . In the mid-1980s, a number of finance companies decided to automate their operations to increase their compet itiveness and because of the high inflation rates of the Brazilian economy required real time transac tions to avoid losses due to rapidly changing prices. It involved creating a totally integrated computing, accounting and cash-point system, a tall order as this had never been tried before. To do so, both financial and computer companies undertaking the project had to be totally transparent to each other, develop very specific channels and codes of communication and interaction between them and collaborate closely in the design, testing and implementation of the system. After several years of work the task was completed and the Brazilian banking informatics system is rec ognized as second to none within the industry. It would have not been possible to achieve this had it not been for the uniqueness of the relationship devel oped between computer companies and financial in stitutions.
While more examples of this kind can be found, the overall picture is very different. In Colombia, buyer-supplier relationships in most sectors are characterized by antagonism and withholding of in formation. Reports made by Monitor (1994 Monitor ( , 1993 for Colombia and Bolivia point out an historically uncooperative relationship between textiles and ap parel manufacturers or an interaction between slaughter houses, tanneries and manufacturers of leather products where information is simply not circulated at all. Colombian flower producers, which require to rapid transport of fresh flowers to the US and European markets, cannot export them because airlines do not want to make available facilities for fresh products. Another study by Alcorta et al. (1997) on technological collaborations in MERCOSUR con cluded that there are few technological collabora tions between firms of the region and between them and foreign firms. Those collaborations that have emerged are marketing agreements or related mainly to the mechanical engineering industry. On the whole, evidences tend to confirm the view of CEPAL (1990) that there is little interaction between firms in LAC.
Another area of potential linkages is between universities and businesses. Here too the experience is not all that positive despite some recent attempts to improve the situation. According to Plonsky (1993) , who summarized a number of studies on university-enterprise cooperation, and Peres (1994), during the import-substitution period there was little interest to cooperate between LAC universities and firms because protected market conditions did not require firms to innovate and universities did not depend financially on the business sector but on the state. Hence, the choice of research was independent of business needs. Over the years the rift between both grew, making it ever so more difficult to link. Since the 1990s a number of modes of cooperation such as transfer offices, university companies, joint programs and projects and national organizations to promote integration between university and industry have emerged. But the evaluation of Velho et al. (1997) on the impact of these attempts in MERCO SUR countries conclude that while they have been well-received by the 'starved-of-funds' academic community, this has not been the case with business which continues to have its own agenda in terms of technological advance. Hence, most programs have had limited success.
Investment in innovation 3.4.1. Aggregate expenditure in R&D
One of the main characteristics of LAC's system of innovation is its very low level of aggregate expenditure in R&D. Total expenditure in R&D in the region amounted to US$2.9 billion or 0.63% of world expenditure in 1990 ( ' 'O n l y S u b -S a h a r a n A f r i c a until 1 990.
' 'I n c l u d e s C h i n a a n d M i d d l e E a s t in 1 992.
S o u r c e : D a t a for 1 9 8 0 -1 9 9 0 f r o m U N E S C O ( 1 9 9 4 ) a n d data for 1 9 9 2 f r o m U N E S C O (1996).
of GDP, LAG'S expenditure fell from 0.44% in 1980 to 0.40% in 1990. During the same period developed countries' R&D ratio over GDP rose from 2.22% to 2.92% while that of other developing countries, in cluding 'tigers' and 'potential tigers,' grew from 0.65% to 0.85%. ^ Brazil's expenditure in R&D over GDP, which is the second highest in the region L atin A m e r i c a a n d the C a r i b b e a n includes all countries in the region. G 7 includes C a n a d a , Fr a n c e , G e r m a n y , Italy, J a p a n , U n i t e d K i n g d o m a n d U n i t e d States. Tigers c o m p r i s e s o f H o n g K o n g , K o r e a , T a i w a n a n d S i n g a p o r e .
P o ten tia l tig ers e n c o m p a s s e s
C h i n a , Indonesia, M a l a y s i a a n d T h a i l a n d . E u r o p e a n N e w l y I n d u s trialized C o u n t r i e s ( N I C s ) i nclude Ireland, G r e e c e , Portugal, S p a i n a n d T u r k e y .
after Cuba, is only slightly higher than the average for non-African, non-LAC developing countries (see Table 2 ). Between 1980 and 1990 , the number of R&D scientists and personnel engaged in R&D increased by 87.5% and LAC had the highest number of R&D scientists and engineers per million population in the developing world. Yet, the expenditure per head in LAC is much lower than other non-African develop ing countries and only 12% higher than that of African countries (Table 3) . Assuming an average monthly wage of US$800 per scientist and engineer in developing countries and of US$4000 in devel oped countries a non-African, non-LAC scientist has left around US$17,750 to spend in materials, support staff and equipment, a developed country scientist ' ' D a t a for the early 1 9 8 0 s in c l u d e o n l y public sector expenditures.
Human resources for R&D
' D a t a for 1 9 95.
S o u r c e s : I N O V A ( 1997), O r o a n d S e b a s t i á n (1993), P e r e s (1994), a n d U N E S C O (1994).
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and engineer around US$49,286 while a LAC scien tist would only have US$7954. Thus, the very low ratio of scientific publications accounted for by LAC scientists (1.3% of the world total in 1985) (CEPAL/UNESCO, 1992).
The structure of R&D
The distribution of R&D resources is also not conducive to technological upgrading. Around 80% of total expenditure is funded by the government, most of which goes to universities ( Table 4 ). The equivalent figure for OECD countries is 43%, for 'tigers' is 36% and for European NlCs is 44%. Privately funded R&D expenditure is around 25%, half of what the private sector finances in other regions (CEPAL/UNESCO, 1992).
Moreover, unlike developed and other developing countries which focus most of their R&D expendi ture efforts on manufacturing, LAC spends mainly in primary products or primary-products related indus tries. By the mid-1980s, only 12% of total R&D expenditure by Brazil was in the manufacturing sec tor, while 55% was in natural resources and agricul ture, and 33% in services. For Argentina in the late-1980s, R&D expenditure in manufacturing was 
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only 4%, while in natural resources and agriculture, and in services it amounted to 64% and 33% respec tively (UNESCO, 1994) . Very little is spent by LAC in experimental devel opment as compared with other regions. In Argentina in 1992, only 6% of the total R&D expenditure was in experimental development. In Mexico in 1989, the same type of expenditure was 34%. By contrast, OECD countries, 'tigers' and European NICs spent 59.5%, 48.5% and 41.2% respectively in 1988 -1990 (UNESCO, 1994 CEPAL/UNESCO, 1992) .
Enterprise investment in innovation
LAC firms invest little in innovation. The small participation of the private sector in aggregate R&D expenditure financing discussed above is a first indi cation of such conduct. But there are other indica tions too. Perhaps the best indication is the research of Matesco (1993 Matesco ( , 1994 on the technological effort of Brazilian firms. Being Brazil the most technologi cally advanced economy in the region, the study should give an indication of the upper limit in inno vation effort. The research was based on the 1985 economic census and focused on 59,994 enterprises selling over US$40,000 per year. These enterprises employed 4.8 million people and had overall sales that year of US$199.1 billion.
The main conclusions were that only 3.5% of firms have any R&D expenditure, out of a total of 2117 firms. Within them there were 89 public enter prises of which 17 were innovators. R&D expendi ture was concentrated on the largest firms and amounted to 0.4% of total sales. The average expen diture over sales for the whole sample was 0.08%. That same year the average R&D expenditure over sales by USA, Trench and German firms had been 3%. Half of the firms that had any expenditure in R&D were in mechanical engineering and chemi cals. Only 413 firms made any payment for technol ogy transfer, amounting to a total of US 30 million. On the whole, with very few exceptions, firms were not interested in improving their innovative capabili ties and the majority of firms had no innovative capacity at all.
Dahlman and Frischtak (1993) reached similar conclusions for Brazil. They found that firms declar ing R&D expenditure in their income tax returns fell from 1050 in 1976-1977 to 780 in 1981-1983, but recovered to 1095 in 1985. R&D expenditure over net revenue increased from 0.2% in 1983 to 0.4% in 1985. Expenditure was highly concentrated in state enterprises (62.6%), with eight firms accounting for more than 50%. Only about 25 private industrial groups were responsible for an additional 17.4% of expenditure. They conclude that Brazilian producers are basing their market position on extensive ex ploitation of natural resources and reliance on lowwage labor rather than on the quality and productiv ity of labor itself and the introduction of new or better products.
A series of similar studies were conducted in Venezuela (Pirela, 1993; Pirela et al., 1991a,b; CEP AL, 1994a) . The studies approached a sales and employment stratified sample of 113 firms in the chemical and petrochemical industry both in 1988 and 1992. The studies found that around 40% of the firms had no knowledge of technological, commer cial, organizational, or accounting problems. Onefourth of the firms felt these issues were not impor tant. Two-thirds of the firms had made no change between 1988 and 1992 despite major macroeco nomic adjustments in the economy. The studies con clude that there is no technological culture among Venezuelan firms. ' A third study on innovation in LAC was con ducted by Waisbluth et al. (1992) . The study has the particularity that it focused on innovative firms and, within them, on the most innovative as the sample was selected from firms that applied for an interna tional innovation award offered by the Spanish gov ernment. One hundred firms were selected for the contest and an in-depth research out of 137 appli cants and 800 contacts for the whole of Latin Amer ica and Spain. Usually, an innovative firm was local, exported between 8-15% of total sales, sold around US$3.2 million of which 50% was said to be associ ated to innovation, spent 4% of its sales in R&D, employed 66 people of which 8 were in R&D and 31% were professionals, and was 25 years old.
O t h e r studies r e p orted in C E P A L ( C E P A L , 1 9 9 4 a ) p oint ou t that Brazilian, M e x i c a n , C h i l e a n a n d V e n e z u e l a n f i r m s in industries like g a r m e n t s a n d textiles h a v e n ot a d a p t e d their tech n o lo g i c a l c o n d u c t to the m o r e liberalized a n d c o m p e t i t i v e e n v i r o n m e n t that L A C is fac i n g at the m o m e n t . Two-thirds of the firms developed their own product while the rest adapted foreign products or licensed them abroad. More than 23% were in the food and health sector, 18% in machinery, 16% in chemicals, 16% in software and telecommunications, 6% in energy and electricity and 9% in others. The study also provided data about the typical Latin American firm as compared with the typical Latin American innovative firm. While the former spent 0.2% of sales in R&D and US$13 per worker in training, employed less than 5% of professionals, exported less than 8% of its production in 1991 and its sales grew 2% in 1989-1991, the latter spent 3.9% of sales in R&D and US$272 per worker in training, employed 31% of professionals, exported 16% of its production in 1991, and its sales grew 16% in 1989-1991.
The empirical literature in the region has provided a few clues as to why there is little investment in innovation by firms. One set of explanations arises from a number of interviews in Chile, Jamaica, Mexico and Venezuela by Macario (1995) . The in terviews were aimed at examining competitive be havior following liberalization and macroeconomic adjustment. They suggest that firms in these coun tries when confronted with a critical situation are likely to react by emphasizing commercial and finan cial solutions, not technological ones. The reason for this is that there is a much larger managerial capacity in commercialization and financial areas because most of the training received by top managers is in these areas. Hence, managers tend to see problems in the light of their experience and training and find solutions along those lines. A reduction in sales or profitability would not be seen, for instance, as a problem of poor product performance or deficient production technology but of, for instance, poor marketing or high debt-equity ratios. Sometimes the assessment of the problem is correct, but not always.
A related explanation is lack of knowledge of the importance of innovation and its main elements. For instance, it may not be known that it is crucial to invest in developing human capital both at manage rial and at other levels of the company. Pérez (1994) pointed out that the new forms of management re quire that workers and staff are no longer treated as a cost but rather as a resource. But this new approach to labor and training is not widely embraced in LAC as only few firms train their staff (CEPAL/UN-ESCO, 1992). Training of managers in the adequate fields may also be necessary.
A third set of explanations focuses on the lack of medium-and long-term vision. Pirela (1993) and Pirela et al. (1991a,b) argued that local entrepreneurs do not have the capacity and possibilities to engage in medium and long term planning required to invest in innovation either because of lack of information about the future or because of the lack of clear and stable rules which are crucial for long range plan ning. It becomes very risky for firms under these conditions to commit themselves to long and com plex learning processes and to the large sums of money that they sometimes entail.
A final explanation refers to entrepreneurship. According to the study on the 100 innovative firms mentioned above, the main motivation to innovate did not come from highly expected returns, competi tion pressures, or government incentives but from the entrepreneur's own interest in developing new prod ucts, gain prestige or create an inventive environ ment (Waisbluth et al., 1992) . Interestingly enough, these motivations cut across all innovative firms except Spanish ones which were motivated much more by competition than by any altruistic drive or value.
Human capital formation
It is quite apparent that education and training play a pivotal role in technological change and growth of NSI. Yet, despite early successes in raising the educational level of LAC population and some use ful experiences in vocational training, of late LAC does not seem to be forming the level, quality and variety of human resources required for technologi cal upgrading.
Over the last 30 years LAC has steadily increased the number of pupils at school. Although there are some significant variations between countries the share of pupils enrolled in primary education as percentage of pupils in their respective enrollment age grew from 58% in 1960 to 88% in 1990, the share of pupils enrolled in secondary education as percentage of pupils in their respective enrollment age grew from 15% in 1960 to 56% in 1990, while the share of pupils in higher education as percentage
of pupils in their respective enrollment age grew from 3% in 1960 to 19% in 1990 . This was achieved during a period of fast growth in the number of pupils (CEPAL/UNESCO, 1992).
Improvements in enrollment have been, however, at the expense of the quality and efficiency of educa tion (CEPAL/ UNESCO, 1992; Haddad et al" 1990; Labarca, 1995) . Students in LAC, particularly in lower-income countries, are learning less than stu dents in developed countries, 'tigers' or 'potential tigers' as measured by mathematics and sciences scores for pupils of similar age. There is also evi dence that the knowledge gap is large and has been increasing in recent years. Expenditure per pupil averaged between 1970-1988 US$1758 in the UK, US$3520 in the US, US$4197 in Sweden and US$2344 in Japan (Labarca, 1995) . In Turkey in 1984 the expenditure in a primary school pupil was US$816. Expenditure in secondary and tertiary pupils was even higher (Haddad et al., 1990 ). Argentina's average expenditure in 1990, the highest in the re gion, was US$349. The performance of other indica tors of quality of education such as teacher/pupil ratios, number of hours in class and failure ratios are also poor. One out of every two pupils has to repeat a year during primary education in LAC while the equivalent ratio is only 2% in advanced countries. Typically, a LAC pupil attends between 700-900 hours of classes per year while in Europe this figure amounts to 1200 hours, and in Korea and Japan to 1400 hours. The curriculum used, particularly in secondary education, is outmoded and rigid, focusing almost exclusively on the massing of data, i.e., the encyclopedia approach, rather than on the develop ment of rational and critical thought and practical experience and is woefully detached from the de mands of both tertiary education and the labour market (Labarca, 1995) .
The public university system, which expanded significantly during the 1950s through to the early 1970s by opening new departments and disciplines, introducing an academic career and stimulating re search, is increasingly delivering lower-quality edu cation due to falling living standards of academic staff and excessive politicisation and bureaucratiza tion of universities (CEPAL/UNESCO, 1992). Partly this has been compensated by the emergence of private universities and non-university higher educa tion ii.stitutions but this has meant that the focus of tertiary education has shifted mainly towards com mercial sciences and away from engineering. In addi tion, or perhaps as a consequence of the shift to wards commercial sciences, research and develop ment, which is mainly carried out in LAC at public universities and related research centers has become concentrated in medical sciences and social sciences and humanities (see Table 5 ).
Despite the success of vocational training schemes, especially those provided by public institu tions with close ties with the private sector like SENAI in Brazil, SENA in Colombia and SENATI in Peru, it has not been possible to extend them widely. Again the private sector has stepped in to cover some of the most obvious gaps but the appar ent need far exceeds supply. At the end of the 1970s, around 4% of the Brazilian and 12% of the Venezue lan workforce had attended a course in a public training institute; but, by 1987 only 2% of LAC workforce had attended to one of these courses, meaning that a LAC worker only gets two weeks outside training every 50 years (CEPAL, 1994b; CEPAL/UNESCO, 1992).
Public policy
Several weaknesses in public policy have also become evident. The first is the lack of clarity in objectives in Latin America's innovation system. Perhaps this is better shown in the foreign invest ment and technology transfer regime. According to Dahlman and Frischtak (1990, 1993) for the last thirty years, Brazilian foreign investment and tech nology transfer policy's rationale was that foreign firms were using technology payments as a form of remitting profits and not so much to develop a local technological capability. Indeed, during the 1970s there was an intense academic and policy debate on how investment and technology payments were be ing used as a means of surplus extraction. It followed that the government imposed strict financial controls and external payments regulations on technology payments and profit remittances. These controls may have had the effect of discouraging foreign compa nies to transfer their most up-to-date technology. A weak domestic property protection regime made it even less worthwhile to transfer more advanced tech-
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nology because of the risks of copy or imitation. Furthermore, the restrictive nature of a trade policy aimed at promoting a local capital goods industry had the effect of limiting the adoption of advanced technologies even more. Hi-tech industry develop ment was in turn hampered by market reserve limita tions which impeded entry to these industries. A policy that had a clear focus on technological development and not so much on balance-of-payments considerations would have put far less empha sis on financial and payments controls and would have had a more balanced approach to industry and technology import-substitution. Although some tech nology transfer regulations included provisions to ensure a degree of local absorption, most of these were difficult to put into practice and, much more so, to enforce. A policy focusing on technological devel opment would have also put more emphasis in devel oping practical mechanisms that ensured local diffu sion of the more advanced foreign technologies.
A second related weakness refers to the lack of priorities in technology policies. One of the striking features of Latin America's innovation system is the great number and variety of ad-hoc institutions, pro grams and policies it is based upon, which in turn mesh with a great number and variety of institutions, programs and policies developed with other pur poses. In addition, during the 1980s many Latin American countries started technology development programs in microelectronics, new materials, bio technology and other frontier areas even though they where no way near to using, let alone producing, the technologies they were allegedly promoting. Hence it is not clear which elements of the system perform a useful function. Katz and Bercovich (1993) pointed out that in Argentina, there are many overlapping research programs, research groups that are just empty boxes, and institutions that do not have the minimum critical scale in terms of experimental equipment or qualified personnel required to attain worthwhile results.
Frischtak (1990a) added that a key problem with Brazilian attempts to develop an electronics industry was the lack of specialization. He points out that the industry was exceedingly diverse as it spanned through many subsectors. This diversity and frag mentation did not allow firms to concentrate their limited technological, marketing and financial re sources in a smaller set of key products that could have been competitive in international markets and would have allowed them to reap economies of scale. Indeed, the lack of firm, industry and intra-in dustry specialization seems to be one of the major limitations to Brazil's industrial development.
Another major public policy weakness was its complexity and detail. Peres (1994 Peres ( , 1997 pointed out that industrial and technological policy in LAC tended to cover all aspects and details that were seen as involved in achieving a particular objective. This approach to policy implied that whenever there was a new policy initiative a myriad of laws and regula tions had also to change, an extremely cumbersome process. In 1984, Mexico introduced PRONAFICE, the National Program for Industry Promotion and Foreign Trade, aimed at reducing external vulnerabil ity and creating employment through trade special ization, promotion of technological modernization, regional and industrial organization restructuring, and improved coordination between agents. Although the program was somewhat successful in promoting a better relationship between government and indus trial firms, it ran into problems two years later, and was scrapped in the late 1980s, because its full implementation involved, among others, setting up or strengthening 76 policy instruments, 33 laws, 66 decrees and 175 presidential resolutions, a total of 274 regulations.
There was also a tendency to increase the scope of plans, programs and instruments to such an extent that they became very difficult to implement. Brazil's industrial and technological policies focused at the level of the industrial sector during the 1950s and 1960s, moved towards more comprehensive indus try-specific policies and programs in the 1970s and to even more detailed schemes targeting whole pro duction chains, including technology and marketingrelated aspects. The New Industrial Policy launched in 1988 was to affect not only the main activities of a specific industry, but also its suppliers of raw materials, components, production and technology services, capital goods and any other activity that affects each industry's competitiveness. The view was that targeting only specific industries might be insufficient because of the linkages between firms and industries. The upshot was that policies could not be applied because they needed a massive admin 8 7 2
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istrative, planning and coordinating capacity that was beyond the Brazilian government's capability (Peres, 1994) .
Finally, technology organisations and public pol icy and their beneficiaries are rarely assessed. Al though programs and policies are often discontinued or replaced this is normally not the result of a, thorough or otherwise, evaluation. There is no tradi tion of public policy assessment in LAC and changes occur more often than not due to changes in overall policy direction or due to changes in specific min istries than from any learning from past mistakes or successes. Indeed there are a number of policy suc cess stories whose experiences do not seem to be informing today's policies. In Brazil, the cases of Usiminas, an integrated steel producer; Embraer, a public enterprise manufacturing small commercial and training planes; and Metal Leve, a thriving piston manufacturer and exporter, and the role gov ernment institutions played in their success have been thoroughly documented (Dahlman and Frischtak, 1990, 1993; Dahlman et al., 1987) . Dini and Peres (1994) have also found effective combina tions of government research centres and universities and technologically dynamic private firms in three regions of the state of Sao Paulo; Campinas-com puting, electronics and telecommunications; Sao Jose dos Campos-aeronautics, electronics and defense; and Sao Carlos-optics, new materials, precision mechanics and fine chemicals. There are other exam ples of successful combinations also in Mexico, Venezuela and Chile (Dahlman et al., 1987; Dini and Peres, 1994) .
There is also no tradition of demanding tangible results from policy beneficiaries (Alcorta, 1993; Peres, 1994) . Much of the debate on industrial and technology policy in Latin America is being carried out in terms of protectionism as opposed to free trade. Yet the evidence in the case of successful countries shows a much more complex picture. It shows that internationally successful firms can oper ate in extremely protected markets or with heavy initial subsidies provided they are subject to strict performance criteria. One such criteria is participa tion in international markets because of the fierce competition that is normally encountered. But, this is not necessarily the only performance criteria. Other criteria such as level of investment in R&D or patenting could be used particularly in non-tradable sectors or for those in which the learning process is exceedingly long.
The performance of LAC's national systems of innovation

4.J. The traditional innovation output indicator: patents
One of the most widely used indicators of innova tive performance is patents. The use of patents as an indicator of output of the NSI is based on the fact that they are given in recognition for the production and disclosure of knowledge with potential industrial application and that time series and comparative data is readily available (Basberg, 1987; Soete, 1981) . However, because of differences in national patent legislation and criteria for granting patents, the num ber of patents granted in the US is normally used for international comparisons.
Data on US patents granted between 1977 and 1986 shows that the share of patents owned by G7 countries' inventors accounted for around 92% of total patents between 1977 and 1989 falling slightly to 91.6% between 1990-1996 (Kumar, 1997). More than 2.1 million patents were granted to all countries over the twenty year period. Patents granted to in ventors from tiger countries rose from 0.19% be tween 1977 and 1982 to 0.38% between 1983-1989 and to 2.32% between 1990-1996 . Patents granted to China have also been rising from a negligible level up to the late 1980s to 0.05% between 1990-1996. In Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela's case, the LAC countries with the largest number of patents granted in the US the trends are more erratic, with the four countries accounting for 0.14% of total patents granted in 1977-1982, falling to 0.07% in 1983-1989 but then rising to 0. 13% in 1990-1996. It is clear from the above data that LAC innova tive performance is negligible either in absolute terms or as compared with developed countries and some other developing countries. Furthermore, in recent years LAC has lost significantly to tiger economies and may soon fall behind China. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that patent indicators are only par tial indicators of innovative performance as not all inventions or innovations are patented nor all patents are innovations. US patent costs may discourage inventors, especially in developing countries, to file for a patent (Kumar, 1997) . It is therefore necessary to complement patent data with other indicators of innovative performance that may reflect better the achievements, or lack of them, of LAC economies.
One way to cater for this need is the index of technological specialization. It depicts how much any particular country or region adapts its relative high to low-tech products trade structure to changing patterns of world trade in high and low technology products. The ITS is defined by;
The index of technological specialisation
Attempts to measure innovative perfonnance of LAC have generally focused on the technological content the regions trade flows by examining the composition of high-tech exports in total exports, changing international market shares or revealed comparative advantage indicators for specific hightech industries or product groups (Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993; Guerrieri, 1994) . * High-tech prod ucts have a number of features that make them good proxies for the technological capability and innova tive performance of a country (Guerrieri and Milana, 1995; Nelson, 1993) . These include the use intensive scientific and research and development inputs, steep learning curves and significant dynamic economies of scale, widespread upstream and downstream ex ternalities and oligopolistic or monopolistic profits.
While the use of indicators based on high-tech products seems to be useful, most of the approaches to assess technological performance mentioned above have the shortcoming that they do not simultane ously relate performance in high-tech industries to the performance in other industries. Moreover, changes in the trade structure from low-to hightechnology products in each individual country or region does not take into account changes in the level and composition of world trade. The share of high-tech products in any country's own export structure may be very different from that country's share in the world market for high-technology prod ucts. Thus, the need for an indicator that takes the changing level and composition of world trade into account. ( 1988) , F a g e r b e r g ( 1992), a n d Guerrieri a n d M i l a n a (1995).
MS" =
ITS; =
jeH MS" MS^J gL j e L
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where, i stands for countries or regions, j stands for SITC product groups (three-digit), MS stands for share in the world market, H is the set of high-tech nology SITC product groups, L is the set of lowtechnology SITC product groups. Xy is the value of exports to the world from country or region i in SITC product group j, Xj is the value of exports to the world from all countries in SITC product group j.
The ITS shows (see Appendix A for method and sources of data), from a dynamic perspective, how a country's relative market shares in high and low technology change. For the ITS, values as well as changes are meaningful. A value below (above) one indicates that a country's export share in high-tech nology markets is bigger (smaller) than its export share in low-technology markets. An increasing (de creasing) value for the ITS along time indicates a movement towards a relatively higher (lower) market shares in high-technology markets.
The ITS is an indicator of a country or region technological specialization in exports and does not reflect the technological specialization of the whole production structure. A country may develop techno logical capabilities in non-tradable areas or in poten tially tradable products which are mainly oriented towards the domestic market. Nevertheless, to the extent that a country has strong domestic technologi cal capabilities they should be reflected in its ex ports, at least in the long run. Moreover from a policy point of view, in the context of the current export oriented strategy of LAC, countries must focus on sectors where those local technological 8 7 4 
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capabilities translate into significant shares in the world market. This is what the ITS intends to show. ' Table 6 presents the share of high and mediumtech exports in total exports to the OECD for several regional groupings in 1977-1995. Medium-tech ex ports are included because they involve a measure of advanced technological capabilities. For simplicity we will refer to all of them as high-tech products.
The technological specialisation of LAC
Export structure and market shares
T h e I T S is n o t a R e v e a l e d C o m p a r a t i v e A d v a n t a g e I n d e x ( I R C A ) a l t h o u g h it i.s clo.sely associated w i t h it, (Balassa, 1965) .
T h e m a i n difference is that w h i l e the I T S relates h i gh-to l o w - Between 1977 and 1995, G7 countries export structure shifted away from natural resources, natural resource-based and labor-intensive manufacturing products towards automotive products, aircraft, com puters and pharmaceutical and specialized chemicals. Japanese exports of automobiles, computers, electri cal machinery and other electronic equipment were a significant contribution to the change in export struc ture and more than compensated for a relative reduc tion in high-tech exports by European and North American G7 countries (Mortimore, 1995) .
'Tigers' have also seen an improvement in the share of high-tech product exports in their total exports, shifting from textiles, clothing, footwear and toys towards automatic data processing and telecom munications equipment and consumer electronics. The 'tigers,' which began with a similar share of high-tech exports as European NICs in the late 1970s had, since 1993, more than half of their exports accounted for by high-tech products and they should, at the present rate of change, have the same structure of exports as G7 countries by the end of this century.
The export structure of 'potential tigers' is also shifting towards high-tech products, albeit at even faster rates than the 'tigers'. From exporting primary agricultural and petroleum products they are now exporting automatic data processing and telecommu nications equipment and consumer electronics. Starting from the lowest share of high-tech exports in total exports of all regional groupings, 'potential tigers' shift towards high-tech products has been ten-fold and by 1994 they had an export structure more geared to high-tech exports than their LAC competitors.
The share of LAC's exports of high-tech products has also risen significantly over the years, from 5.7% in 1977 to 27.4% in 1995. Although still far from G7 countries and 'tigers,' technological upgrading, as shown by the change in the export structure, has been faster than in the G7 and European NICs. From specializing in petroleum and petroleum products, coffee and metals, the region is now producing motor vehicles and their components and electrical 
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T i g e r s Potential tigers E u r o p e a n N I C s worrying. LAC is losing out with regards to 'tigers' and may do so also with regards to 'potential tigers,' but it is closing the gap on G7 countries and Euro pean NICs. Indeed, LAC competes in the same product groups as the latter, which may mean that some of LAC gains may have been at the expense of European NICs. Yet, there are still several causes for concern.
To begin with, although falling, primary products still constitute a large proportion of LAC exports. In 1993, around 1 / 3 of LAC exports to OECD were accounted for by primary products. Furthermore, the revealed comparative advantage index for primary products in LAC increased from 1.48 in 1977 to 2.19 in 1993. After more than 50 years of industrializa tion, LAC is still heavily specialized in primary products. By contrast, developing Asian economies' natural resource exports decreased from over 50% in 1980 to 16.5% in 1993 16.5% in (Mortimore, 1995 . If one considers primary products together with manufac tures based on natural resources, the drop in the case of Asian economies is even higher.
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distribution equipment. This achievement, however, has also to be assessed against a backdrop of falling overall export shares (see Table 7 ). Table 8 presents estimations for the ITS for 1977-1995. Several conclusions meet the eye. First, although G7 countries are the most specialized in high-tech export to the OECD, they have been per sistently losing ground, as this fast-growing market is taken over by producers from other regions. Be tween 1977 and 1995, the ITS fell by 23% for G7 countries. Second, 'tigers,' 'potential tigers,' and LAC have increasingly stepped in the high-tech arena, albeit it is only the 'tigers' that have been able to compete successfully in high-tech products. Third, the 'potential tigers' and LAC's ITS is similar, although that of the 'potential tigers' started from a much lower base, and is catching up with that of European NICs.
Patterns of technological specialisation
In the face of the previous figures, the technologi cal performance of LAC does not seem to be all that 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 Fig. 1. L a t i n A m e r i c a a n d the C a r i b b e a n I T S , 1 9 7 7 -1 9 9 5 , Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the technological performance is quite different if Mex ico is removed. Because of NAFTA membership, Mexico has preferential access to the US market. In addition, Mexico has had successful export processing zones in its northern border for a number of years. Both export-processing zones and NAFTA membership have attracted significant industrial in vestment aimed basically at the US market, an ad vantage that not all of LAC has. '' Fig. 1 shows the performance of the ITS without Mexico. There are significant differences between the indexes with and without Mexico, reaching up to four times in recent years. Further note that without Mexico, the ITS remains flat for the 18-year period of analysis at around 0.10. This index is similar to that of the 'potential tigers,' when they started their technological upgrading in 1977.
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In Mexico, only a few products, such as vehicles and vehicle parts, electrical distribution equipment and apparatus, combustion engines, TVs and telecommunications equipment, account for the ex pansion of trade in high-tech products. Their share increased from 9.2% of total exports to OECD in 1980 to 31% in 1993. Except for vehicles and car engines, most of these are produced mainly in the export processing zones. Only weak linkages are built to the domestic economy and even in the case of the vehicle industry, which is based in mainland Mexico, earlier stronger linkages with local special ized suppliers seem to be waning (Capdeville et al., 1995) .
The innovative performance of the other LAC countries is in sharp contrast with Mexico's. Ar gentina, Brazil and the Caribbean, which showed an increase in their ITS in the 1980s, fell behind to levels well below those of 'potential tigers' by the early 1990s (Table 9 ). For Caribbean, as well as for Central America, export processing zones account M e x i c o is also a n O E C D m e m b e r , b u t O E C D i m p o r t da t a for 1 9 7 7 -1 9 9 5 that w e u s e in this p a p e r d o n o t inc l u d e M e x i c o .
" N e e d l e s s to say, w e a k linkages are a l w a y s preferable to n o linkages. A l s o , e x p o r t p r o c e s s i n g s c h e m e s a l t h o u g h p e r h a p s e x p lo ita tiv e in t e r m s o f l a bor regulations, safety a n d social security, s o m e t i m e s create e m p l o y m e n t that w o u l d no t h a v e b e e n c reated otherwise. T h e y m a y contribute to the a c c u m u l a t i o n o f h u m a n capital, e v e n if it w e r e o n l y o f the l o w e r skills type. It w o u l d s e e m that a k e y c h a l l e n g e for public policy w o u l d b e to m a k e these p r o c e s s i n g z o n e s m o r e integrated to the local e c o n o m y a n d r e g u l a tions. O f t e n e x p o r t p r o c e s s i n g z o n e s s c h e m e s h a v e b e e n s e e n b y g o v e r n m e n t s as s e c o n d -r a t e industrialization a n d , in the c a s e o f M e x i c o , it h a s b e e n located s o far f r o m d o m e stic industrial centers that it is difficult to r e a p a n y o f the externalities that m a y arise f r o m t h e m .
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T a b l e 9 I n d e x o f t e c h nological specialization, 1 9 7 7 -1 9 9 5 A r g e n t i n a Brazil C a r i b b e a n countrie. for their relatively higher ITS. The ITS of other LAC countries stagnated throughout the whole period at extremely low levels. Furthermore, a closer view of the components of LAC high-tech products without Mexico reveals not only that LAC performance in high-tech products is stagnant but that it has switched towards their lower end in terms of technological competence. Fig. 2 shows the trends in the ITS separating between high and medium-tech products. From a technological specialisation that was relatively geared to high-tech products in the late 1970s, e.g., aircraft, telecommu nications equipment and early industrial and con sumer electronics, LAC excluding Mexico had moved by the mid-1990s to a specialisation pattern where medium-tech products are predominant. These prod ucts are manufactured mainly in the mechanical en gineering and transport equipment industries. In Ar gentina and Brazil, for instance, the ITS for the more advanced high-tech products fell from 0.12 and 0.27 respectively in 1979 to 0.9 and 0.13 respectively in 1994. The ITS for the less advanced or medium high-tech products remained at around 0.10 in Ar gentina and rose from 0.24 in 1979 to 0.33 in 1994 in Brazil.
In sum, LAC technological performance has been modest. Except for the Mexican export processing zones and vehicle and mechanical engineering indus try, LAC has very little more to show in terms of technological upgrading and internationally competi- tive high-tech industries. Rather, the pattern of spe cialization in trade has returned to, if not remained in, primary products and low-tech manufactured goods. This is true even after macroeconomic stabi lization was achieved in the early 1990s as there is no significant difference in the trends prior or after stabilization.
Concluding remarks
l a g 's innovation systems have developed into weak entities. Although, emerging with great poten tial at the end of the 1950s and 1960s, and expanding considerably during the 1970s, they have since not been able to consolidate into an effective promoter of technological upgrading and innovation. There are significant specific accomplishments in policy mak ing, institutional development and education and training but it has not been possible to replicate them throughout the system. The upshot has been that the output of LAC's innovation systems has also been modest. Again, although there are a number of sig nificant examples of successful performance by and large, patenting for instance, has been negligible. And, perhaps more importantly, the innovative per formance of LAC's innovation systems, with the only exception perhaps of Mexico, as measured by the ITS, is low in absolute terms and has lost rela tively to many countries that started at similar levels twenty years ago. Furthermore, LAC exports are relatively less geared today to the most technologi cally advanced products than what they were in the mid-1970s.
It is true, of course, that there is no need for a region or country to produce or excel in all high-tech products. Nelson (1993) pointed out that there does not seem to have strong empirical support for the view that countries are at an advantage or disadvan tage if they have or do not have high-tech firms and that transnational corporations have increasingly to collaborate with other firms and share their high-tech knowledge to pay for the high R&D costs. Yet, it is also true that all countries that are internationally competitive in some high-tech products have enjoyed continuous growth. They do not always grow as fast in the short-run as other countries, but they are certainly not stagnant and in any case they are creating the conditions for subsequently sustained productivity and output increases. The intrinsic ad vantages of high-tech products have already been pointed out. From a growth and development per spective, while efforts to manufacture the range of high-tech products may not be warranted, a combina tion of high, low or labour-intensive and natural resource-based products which in the long-run switches towards a relatively higher share of hightech products, without attempting to produce all of them, would seem to be 'wise'. Labour-and natural resource-intensive pathways to growth are always limited by the availability of natural and human resources and decreasing returns whilst strategies based on the continuous use of knowledge do not seem to face such constraints. As for technological collaboration, as pointed out earlier, there is little cooperation from abroad with LAC firms, except perhaps for marketing agreements. For cooperating LAC firms must first have the knowledge to share.
Whatever one's view on the need for high-tech products for growth and development, however, it must not be forgotten that LAC's innovative perfor mance in high-tech products is not only not improv ing but seems to be worsening. And, coming back full circle to the Latin American debate on the causes for the poor international competitiveness of the region, this has not been the exclusive result of macroeconomic maladies or low investment.
Appendix A. The method and data sources
To estimate the index of technological specializa tion, the Competitive Analysis of Nations (CANP-LUS) database of ECLAC (1997) was used. The CANPLUS is a database and software of foreign trade statistics built on the basis of the United Na tion's COMTRADE statistics of three-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC, second re vision). It has entries for 239 three-digit product groups and 89 countries for 1977-1995.
The international market or world market is the imports of the 1990 member countries of the OECD on grounds that it is a demanding market for which there exists reliable, consistent and up-to-date infor mation. Given that in this paper, we develop an index to evaluate technological performance, it is particularly important to focus on high-quality mar kets as it is the case for the OECD ones. Consumers in high-quality markets have higher income, face more alternatives regarding their consumption bun dles and have more experience to determine the quality of goods than consumers in low-quality mar kets. As Nelson (1993) pointed out " if firms do not compete on world markets they do not compete strongly." (p. 512).
A country's degree of competitiveness in any particular product group is determined by CAN-PLUS on the basis of its market share of the OECD market (Mandeng, 1991; Mortimore, 1995) . Market shares are calculated as three-year moving averages. Classification into high-tech and low-tech industries has been done on the basis of an adaptation of a previous classification developed at ECLAC (CEPAL, 1993) . It consists of classifying the 239 Standard International Trade Classification (SITC, revision 2) product entries on the basis of OECD's industry-based research and development intensity ratios. In this paper high-tech products includes OECD's high and medium R&D intensity manufac turing products while low-tech consists of low R&D manufacturing goods and primary products.
Classifying products according to technological intensity is not without risks. Available export data does not allow to determine the degree of domestic content of those exports. Exports from highly inte grated national economies are treated in the same way as exports from less integrated ones. This situa tion is particularly acute in the case of economies where export processing zones have minimal integra tion with the domestic production structure. In LAC, this may be the case of the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico.
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